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Abstract—Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETS) are mobile
nodes moving rapidly and they use wireless connections to
connect to various networks or nodes. The dynamic nature of
MANETs, make it vulnerable to attack by intruders. The sending
and passing of nodes are based on several routing protocols.
The packets do not reach the destination and some form of
secure mechanism based on trust or friendship are deployed to
protect the network integrity. Denial of service attacks is one
of the typical attack type in mobile adhoc network. In this
paper, we deployed Black hole and Grey hole attack. Black
hole attack absord all data packets that are sent to its node
whereas grey hole attack will drop some packet for a particular
network destination based on packets type, time or randomly
selected portion of packets. In this experiment we simulated
several routing protocol to investigate the secure mechanism in
protecting from the blackhole ad greyhole attack. The findings
are presented and discussed.
Index Terms—AODV; MANET; Trust
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile adhoc network comprises autonomous and anony-
mous nodes roaming freely without centralize controller to
determine the communication path. Each nodes can function
as a router by itself. They rely on each other in forwarding
packets. Communication among node exist without the need
of a supporting fixed router or access point. Specific feature
of MANET such as transmission range, shared resources of
wireless devices, resource consumptions and the mobility of
nodes may cause security and efficiency issues. MANET are
not immune to false alarms cause by blackmail attacker and
other potential attackers that can target the operational of a
routing protocol in an adhoc network.
In this paper, AODV was chosen as the basic protocol for
performance comparison due to the fact that AODV can run
properly in high traffic communication and high mobility.
The simulation on AODV extension namely IDSAODV and
PHR-AODV mechanism under packet dropping attack is also
conducted.
Adhoc network is also commonly called as Mobile Ad-
hoc NETwork (MANET) because of its mobility function.
In the ad-hoc mode, the mobile station such as a laptop
or a PDA can communicate directly with one another using
Independent Basic Service Set (IBSS). This communication
can be established without connection to a wired backbone.
In addition, adhoc network is independent because the device
in this mode can act either as base station or mobile station.
II. ROUTING IN MANET
Routing in MANET has several characteristic which are
dynamic topologies, bandwidth-constrained link, energy con-
strained operation and limited physical security [1]. The adhoc
topology network change with time as the mobile nodes
join or move from the network. The routing protocol in
MANET is divided into two categories based on management
routing table. These two categories are proactive and reactive
protocol[2]. In proactive protocol, nodes allocate resource to
track routes in routing table. In reactive protocol, routes are
discovered only when needed to preserve network resources.
Basically, MANET is based on protocol as shown in figure 1
Fig. 1. adhoc Routing Protocol
A. AdHoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Protocol
AODV is a reactive routing protocol which creates a path to
the destination when required. Routes are not built until certain
nodes start to send route discovery message as an intention to
communicate data with each other. The advantages of using
AODV protocol are low memory overhead, minimize the use
of network resource and the ablilty to run in high network
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mobility. The reasons for these advantages are the routing
information is only stored in source node, destination node
and intermediate node which is involve in data transmission.
In AODV, there are three procedure involves in the com-
munication which are path discovery, path establishment and
path maintenance. Three types of message controls are used
in AODV which are Route Request (RREQ), Route Reply
(RREP) and Route Error (RRER) message[3].
The procedure of AODV protocol starts with the source
node establishing the communication with the destination node
by issuing route discovery procedure. The source node broad-
cast RREQ message to all accessible neighbours. Then, the
intermediate node that receives the RREQ message will check
the request. If the intermediate node is the destination, it will
reply with RREP message. If not, the RREQ message from
the source node will be forwarded to the other intermediate
nodes. Figure 2 shows the route discovery procedure.
Fig. 2. Route Discovery Procedure [4]
B. PHR-AODV and IDSAODV
PHR-AODV was proposed by [5] to enhance the security
aspect on Reverse-AODV (R-AODV) protocol. PHR-AODV
performed multipath communication by using path hoping
routing mechanism. The number of paths from the source node
to the destination node is determined based on the number of
edges from the source node. In this protocol, the message
is delivered through multipath route. When a path is broken
during the communication process, that path will be eliminated
from the path list. When there is no path in the list, the node
sends back RREQ message to establish new path.
IDSAODV was proposed by [6] to eliminate the effect of
black hole attack by implementing RREP caching on existing
AODV protocol. The authors of IDSAODV examine when
simulation under black hole attack, there is a second RREP
message come to source node from the destination node. Thus,
this method is invented to create RREP caching to count the
second RREP message.
In both of the studies for PHR-AODV and IDSAODV,
the authors do not evaluate their protocols under grey hole
attack. In this paper, these two protocols will be evaluate
under black and grey hole attack to determine its performance.
Besides, IDSAODV only evaluate its performance on packet
loss. The other performance metrics like end to end delay and
throughput is ignored. The significant of this research is to
compare which protocol can successfully eliminate or reduce
the attack.
III. TYPE OF ATTACK
Mobile adhoc network faced vulnerabilities from various
attacks due to high number of nodes involve in the com-
munication process. The attacks that always occur in adhoc
network are black hole attack, grey hole attack, impersonation
and modification attack.
A. Packet Dropping Attacks
Basically, packet dropping attack is categories as Denial of
Service attack [7], [8], [9], [10] . This situation occurs when
node does not forwards the requests message to destination
nodes by dropping all or some of the packets. The packet
dropping attack consists of two types which are black hole
attack and grey hole attack.
B. Black Hole Attack
Black hole is a malicious node or attacker node that attempts
to absorbs the network traffic and drops all packets. It is
also forging route replies to create fake routes with it as an
intermediate node.
The black hole will divert and intercept all the traffic and
subsequently drop packets that it received. The source node
considers the message has arrived and the communication has
been successfully established. The attacker node absorbs all
the messages itself and in fact the message did not arrive
at the destination node. The black hole node sends the false
RREP message to the sender. Therefore, the requesting nodes
(sender) assume that route discovery process is completed and
ignore other RREP messages and begin to send packets over
black hole node [11], [4].
Fig. 3. Scenario of black hole attack
Based on the figure 3 above, node 1 acts as sender node,
node 5 as destination node while node 2, 3 and 4 acts as black
hole node. Node 4 receives a request message, and send reply
message to the source node. In this case, source node which
is node 1 assumes the message has arrived and assume that
the communication has been successfully performed. Actually,
the message did not reach at the destination node (node 5) and
the communication between node 1 and node 5 failed.
C. Grey Hole Attack
Grey hole can be classified as faulty node rather than
explicitly malicious. Grey hole does not falsify route replies
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but periodically drop the packets. This kind of dropping
against black hole, grey hole does not drop all packets. This
means that grey hole sometimes act as a normal node and
other times act like a malicious node [4], [12], [13].
Fig. 4. Scenario of grey hole attack
Based on the figure 4 above, the node 1 act as sender
broadcasting RREQ message to the destination node 8. The
grey hole node which are node 4 and 5 refuse to forward
RREQ message and simply drop them.
IV. NETWORK SIMULATION
In this simulation, 20 nodes are used to evaluate the impact
of malicious attack (black hole and grey hole) using three
protocols which are IDSAODV, PHR-AODV and AODV. In
every simulation, UDP connections are established between
even numbered nodes (0 (zero) included) and odd numbered
nodes. Node 18 and Node 19 did not have a connection to
any other node in the network [6]. In the scenarios, even
numbered nodes (Node 0 - Node 16) are functioned as the
sending nodes and odd numbered nodes (Node 1 - Node 17)
are functioned as the receiving nodes. The even numbered
nodes send the packets to the next odd numbered nodes, for
example Node 0 to Node 1, Node 2 to Node 3, Node 4 to
Node 5 and so on. In the scenarios, UDP agents are attached
to the even numbered nodes and NULL agents are attached
to odd numbered nodes. NULL agents act as traffic sink and
attached at the destination nodes [14]. As a result, there are
9 total connections have been implemented between the 18
nodes and all of these connections are always between the
same nodes. A scenario between 20 nodes that move from a
random starting point to a random destination with a speed that
is randomly chosen, during 500 seconds, in a 750 x 750 meter
flat space is simulated. The simulation topology is illustrated
in figure 5.
Fig. 5. Simulation Tapology
A. Simulation Setting
The Constant Bit Rate (CBR) application that generates
constant packets are attached through the UDP connection.
The duration of network simulation is 500 seconds and the
CBR connections started at the first second of the scenario
and lasts until 450 seconds. The packet size for CBR is 512




Simulation Time 500 s
Topology 750 x 750 m
Number of nodes 20
Number of attacks 1
Traffic type CBR
Packet rate 10 Kbits
Packet size 512 bytes
Nodes in the simulation are generated by “for” loop state-
ment of the Tcl language. These statements that create the
nodes are shown in figure 6. “$ns node-config - adhocRouting
blackholeAODV” statement changes routing protocol of the
node configuration as “blackholeAODV” that we implemented
in NS. After this statement, the second loop creates the last
node. Changing the “$val(nnaodv)” variable we can create
AODV in Black Hole and AODV in Grey Hole nodes as we
wish.
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# Creating mobile AODV nodes for simulation
puts “Creating nodes...”
for {set i 0} {$i ¡ $val(nnaodv)} {incr i} {
set node ($i) [$ns node]
$node ($i) random-motion 0 ;#disable random motion
}
# The last node act as attacker node (Black/grey hole attack)
# Creating Black/Grey Hole nodes for simulation
$ns node-config -adhocRouting blackholeAODV
for {set i $val(nnaodv)} {$i ¡ $val(nn)} {incr i} {
set node ($i) [$ns node]
$node ($i) random-motion 0;#disable random motion
$ ns at 0.01
}
Fig. 6. Implementation of attacker node in wireless environment
V. PERFORMANCE METRIC
According to [15], selecting performance metric is an im-
portant step to evaluate the result of experiments. The metrics
used in this research have been used widely by the other
researchers in computer network [15], [16], [17].
A. Packet delay
The packet delay is the average time in order to traverse
the packet inside the network. This includes the time from
generating the packet from sender up till the reception of the
packet by receiver or destination and expressed in seconds.
In this research, end to end delay is used, which means the
average time taken for the packet sent from the source node to
the destination node. End to end delay means the amount of
time of packets takes to transmit from sender to the destination.
Packet end to end delay formulated in equation 1 as:
End to end delay =
time




Throughput is the ratio of the total amount of data which
reaches the receiver from the sender to the time it takes for
the receiver to receive the last packet. It is represented in bits
per second or packets per seconds. In MANETs throughput
is affected by various changes in topology, limited bandwidth
and limited power. Unreliable communication is also one of
the factors which adversely affect the throughput parameter.






The performance metric considered in this research are
packet end to end delay and throughput. A simulation model
was developed using NS-2 (version 2.34) to analyze the
performance results under of three conditions below:
i. Packet dropping attack using normal AODV protocol
ii. Packet dropping attack using PHR-AODV protocol
iii. Packet dropping attack using IDSAODV protocol
A. Packet End to End Delay
Packet end to end delay for AODV, PHR-AODV and ID-
SAODV under black hole attack, grey hole attack and without
any attack are evaluated.
Based on figure 7, 8 and 9, the delay for all protocol is high
except in the case where there is no attack on the network. As
we can see, delay on black hole attack is lower compared to
others. This is because during the black hole attack, there is
no need to send RREQ and RREP packet due to black hole
node already sent its RREQ packets to the sender before the
destination node reply RREP packet. All the RREQ packets
are absorbed by the black hole node. Thus, the delay is less.
Fig. 7. End to end delay under black hole attack
Fig. 8. End to end delay under grey hole attack
Fig. 9. End to end delay without attack
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Based on the three protocols, we can conclude the per-
formance of IDSAODV protocol is better than PHR-AODV
and basic AODV in term of lower delay. This is because
IDSAODV have a special mechanism which is RREP caching
to count the number of RREP message. For PHR-AODV
protocol, the delay time of packet data to reach destination
increases due to many alternative paths to send packet data to
the destination node. However, in term of simulation without
attack, AODV is better compared to others. The reason is
that AODV is created to adapt normal network environment.
There is no need to use alternative path mechanism in packet
transmission because it will consume more delay.
B. Throughput
Throughput is the number of packet received over the
amount of time. From the table below, it can be seen that the
throughput value under black hole attack is worst compared
to grey hole. From the previous analysis, the value of packet
loss under black hole attack is high because black hole node
discards the packet rather than forwarding it to the destination.
As the result, low number of packet received at the receiver
and thus the value of throughput is also low.
Fig. 10. Throughput with black hole attack
Fig. 11. Throughput with grey hole attack
Fig. 12. Throughput without any attack
Refering to the figure 10 , 11 and 12, it can be seen that
the throughput of PHR-AODV is good under all conditions.
This is because when the amount of packet loss is low, the
value of throughput is high because the number of successful
packet received at the receiver is high.
VII. CONCLUSION
The experiments are conducted to show which protocols
can performed efficiently under black hole and grey hole
attack. Performance metrics such as end to end delay and
throughput have been used for the purpose of evaluation. From
the analysis, it can be seen that the performance of PHR-
AODV is better than the others in term of high throughput,
and low delay under attack.
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